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This paper explores the effect of remittances across the distribution of income. Based on 
a panel of 46 countries that covers the period between 1970 and 2000, we find that the effect 
of  remittances  is  non-monotone  across  the  distribution  of  income  and  strongest  in  low 
income countries. The impact of remittances is positive and decreasing in income for the 
bottom 70 percent of the population, and negative and increasing in income in the top 20 
percent of the population. All else equal, remittances decrease inequality as their effect is 
mostly felt among the poor and they are negatively related to the income of the rich. We 
estimate that for low income countries a 1 percent increase in remittances would increase the 
first decile’s income by approximately 0.43 percent, while the same change would increase 
the  seventh  decile’s  income  by  only  0.04  percent.  In  contrast,  a  1  percent  increase  in 
remittances is associated with a 0.10 percent decrease in the income of the top 10 percent of 
the population.   
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1.    INTRODUCTION 
 
Among the many dimensions of greater global economic integration, international 
migration is probably the most controversial and debated one. People moving across 
borders, and countries being either sources or recipients of migrants, imply that there are 
not only economic but also social consequences from migration, which fuel most of the 
debate. 
The focus of this paper is on the distributional effects of migrants’ remittances to 
their home countries.  In  particular, we explore income changes in the home  country 
along  the  distribution  of  income.  This  in  turn  allows  us  to  quantify  the  impact  of 
remittances on the migrants' home country inequality. 
Our main finding is that the impact of remittances on income is strongest in low 
income countries and non-monotone along the distribution of income. In other words, 
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the effect of remittances is either positive or negative depending on the level of income. 
In  particular,  we  find  that  the  poor  are  the  greater  beneficiaries  from  migrants’ 
remittances. As one moves up on the distribution of income, the sensitivity of income to 
remittances tends to zero and becomes negative for the top 20 percent of the population. 
From a macroeconomic perspective this implies that remittances decrease inequality as 
the income of the poor increases, while the income of the rich decreases. 
The contribution  of the study is two-fold.  First, we construct a new  database on 
remittances and inequality, which combines a new dataset on remittances data from the 
World  Bank  (2007)  and  a  recently  revised  version  of  the  World  Income  Inequality 
Database from UN-WIDER (2007). And second and foremost, the paper calculates the 
effect  of  remittances  at  the  decile  level.  This  allows  for  a  better  understanding  of 
remittances  as  a  poverty  reduction  mechanism  as  it  decomposes  their  effect  on  the 
bottom, middle and top of the distribution of income. 
Our distribution-wide approach to the effect of remittances is consistent with, and 
complements previous studies that calculate the impact of remittances on poverty. For 
instance, Adams and Page (2005) and IMF (2005) document that remittances reduce 
headcount poverty based on cross-country samples. Survey based studies of individual 
countries  confirm  similar  effects  in  Ghana  and  Guatemala  (Adams  (2004,  2005), 
respectively), and in Latin America analyzed by Acosta et al. (2007).
1 
Furthermore, we provide new insights into the effect of remittances on inequality. 
While  the  consensus  in  the  literature  is  that  remittances  reduce  poverty,  there  is 
conflicting evidence in regard to the effect of remittances on inequality. McKenzie and 
Rapoport  (2004)  find  that  remittances  have  decreased  inequality  in  Mexico;  Adams 
(2005) reports that they increased inequality in Ghana; De and Ratha (2005) document a 
decrease in inequality in Sri Lanka due to remittances; and Acosta et al. (forthcoming) 
find that remittances decreased inequality in Latin America. 
By quantifying the effect of remittances at the decile level, we can determine their 
relative  effect  by  income  decile,  and  whether  that  implies  a  decrease  or  increase  in 
inequality. We estimate that the effect of remittances in low income countries is positive 
(and  decreasing)  for  the  bottom  70  percent  of  the  population  and  negative  (and 
increasing) for the top 2 deciles, implying that remittances reduce inequality. For richer 
countries we find that remittances increase the income of the bottom 20 percent of the 
population, thus they are negatively related to inequality too. We believe this approach 
provides a more accurate picture of the distributional effects of remittances than those 
based on aggregate measures of inequality such as the Gini coefficient. 
To  conduct  the  analysis  we  run  a  set  of  econometric  tests  that  control  for  other 
determinants of income, and identify the contribution of remittances to income at the 
decile level. Of particular interest is to determine whether a differential effect across 
 
1 For a comprehensive overview on trends and statistics on world migration and remittances see World 
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deciles exists. We exploit the symmetry across decile income regression equations to 
separate  the  decile-specific  effect  of  remittances  through  a  system  of  Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions (SUR). 
An  important  part  of  the  literature  on  migration  has  focused  on  the  welfare  and 
distributional effects of migration from a factor market perspective. That is, it has mostly 
been  concerned  with  the  impact  of  migration  on  wages  in  both  the  home  and  host 
countries, and the price of other factors of production that are either complements or 
substitutes of migrant labor. This paper abstracts from those effects as well as from any 
exchange rate or Balance of Payments implications from remittances. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we lay out the empirical strategy to 
analyze  our  data;  section  3  describes  the  dataset;  section  4  presents  the  estimation 
results; and section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2.    EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
This  section  describes  the  empirical  strategy  used  to  estimate  the  effect  of 
remittances on the distribution of income at the decile level. To assess such effect we 
work with a parsimonious specification in which mean decile income is determined by a 
country’s  level  of  income,  openness  to  trade,  macroeconomic  stability,  and  human 
capital. Following UN-WIDER (2007), throughout the analysis the first decile is defined 
as  the  bottom  10  percent  of  the  population,  the  second  decile  as  the  subsequent  10 
percent of the population, and so on until the tenth decile which corresponds to the top 
10 percent of the population. 
In order to quantify the effect of remittances on inequality, we use a cross-section of 
countries to identify the sensitivity of household income to remittances flows. In doing 
so, we control for the country’s average income level, human capital, inflation, imports 
and  exports  as  fraction  of  GDP,  and  other  country-specific  characteristics.  For  each 
country, we estimate income by decile following Dollar and Kraay (2002), where decile 
mean  income  is  given  by  the  decile’s  share  of  income  multiplied  by  mean  income 
divided by 0.1.
2 
The reduced form model for quantifying the effect of remittances on the 
th j   decile 
(log) income of country i at time t is given by: 
 
t i t i t i t i dj X r y , , , 1 0 , , e g b b + + + = .                                                                                (1) 
 
2 To see this  let  1 d y   represent the average income within the  first income decile, and let  Y and  1 s  
stand for total income (or GDP) and the income share of the first decile, respectively. Then, it must be the 
case  that  = Y s * 1 (0.1*population)* 1 d y .  This  way,  ) 1 . 0 / ( 1 1 s yd = *(Y/population),  is  the  average  decile 
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In this specification, r is the log of real remittances; X is a vector of country-specific 
characteristics (which includes mean income, human capital, openness to trade); and  e  
is a zero-mean disturbance term. 
Based on the definitions above,  1 b   represents the elasticity of decile income  dj y  
with respect to remittances. Furthermore, any systematic pattern in the estimates of  1 b  
will determine whether remittances increase or decrease inequality. For instance, if  1 b  
is positive and decreasing in income, then remittances decrease inequality as they have a 
larger effect on the income of the poor, all else equal. 
In section 4, we present the coefficient estimates of Equation 1 with variations on the 
set of controls, inclusion of time dummies; and estimation techniques such as pooled 
OLS, seemingly unrelated regressions, and fixed effects. 
 
 
3.    DATA SET 
 
To analyze the effect of remittances on income across the distribution of income, we 
construct a panel of countries that draws on several sources of data. In regard to the main 
variables, remittances and inequality, we use remittances data from World Bank (2007), 
and take the inequality series (income shares by decile) from UN-WIDER (2007) World 
Income Inequality Database (V 2.0b). Real GDP per capita in purchasing power parity is 
drawn from Heston et al. (2002). 
In  order  to  control  for  other  determinants  of  income  such  as  human  capital 
(secondary school enrollment relative to secondary school age group), degree of trade 
openness (sum of imports and exports relative to GDP), and inflation, we use the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators. Finally, to transform the remittances data, which 
is  originally  reported  in  nominal  terms,  into  real  terms,  we  use  the  base  year  2000 
Implicit Price Deflator series from BEA (2007). 
The unbalanced panel contains observations for the period between 1960 and 2006, 
for 207 countries. The maximum number of observations for a country is 57 and the 
minimum 1. Contemporaneous observations for all variables reduce the sample to fewer 
countries and fewer years. In the Appendix we report the sample used for the estimates 
reported in section 4. 
With  data  from  countries  with  multiple  contemporaneous  observations  for  decile 
income and remittances, we are able to provide an initial assessment on the relation 
between  remittances  and  decile  income.  We  expect  that  as  remittances  rise,  decile 
income  increases  as  well.  In  particular,  Figure  1  shows  that  for  three  countries  at 
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S 
 
Note: This figure plots the natural logarithm of remittances against natural logarithm of 1
st decile income in 
Sri Lanka, South Korea and France. 
 
Figure 1.    Remittances and Decile Income 
 
 
Observations from Sri Lanka, South Korea, and France suggest a positive effect of 
remittances  on  the  income  of  the  first  decile.  Moreover,  Figure  1  highlights  how 
remittances  have  increased  over  time,  as  well  as  the  first  decile’s  income  in  those 
countries. The graph also shows how the inflow of remittances and first decile income in 
France are larger than in the other two countries. 
Another  dimension  that  the  dataset  allows  us  to  explore  is  the  strength  of  this 
channel across deciles. That is, we can ask the question which decile benefits more from 









3 Though not related to this study, Figure 2 shows how the bottom decile was the hardest hit by the 
decrease in income in the year 2000. 
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income deciles in Sri Lanka. Across deciles both remittances and income have increased over time, except for 
the drop in income in the year 2000. 
 
Figure 2.    Remittances and Decile Income: Sri Lanka 
 
 
It is important to note that these figures only provide rough correlations that do not 
control for other factors behind decile income growth. Furthermore, they cannot help to 
determine whether the effect of remittances on income is uniform across deciles or not. 
These issues are carefully assessed in the next section. 
 
 
4.    RESULTS 
 
Based on the model outlined in section 2, our objective is to quantify the effect of 
remittances across the distribution of income once we control for other determinants of 
decile income. These include variables such as human capital, macroeconomic stability, 
and openness to trade. 
We  begin  by  presenting  the  relationship  between  remittances  and  decile  income 
based on the pooled sample.  Figure 3 shows a controlled scatter plot  of remittances 
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against the income of the first, third, fifth, and seventh deciles. The diagram plots the 
residuals  of  decile  income  regressed  on  secondary  school  enrollment,  inflation,  per 
capita GDP, and the sum of exports and imports relative to GDP versus remittances. 
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Notes: This figure plots remittances controlled for secondary enrollment, inflation, real per capita GDP and 
the share of exports and imports relative to GDP against income for the first, third, fifth and seventh deciles. 
Observations corresponding to the bottom decile are represented by the thickest markers; higher deciles are 
represented by progressively thinner markers. 
 
Figure 3.    Remittances and Decile Income 
 
 
In  Figure  3  the  slopes  of  the  lines  represent  the  coefficient  estimates  for  1 b   in 
Equation 1. We portray higher income deciles by increasingly thinner regression lines. 
For instance, the thickest line (steepest) corresponds to the first decile, while the thinnest 
(flattest) corresponds to the seventh decile. Hence, our first finding is that remittances 
seem to have positive, but decreasing impact within the distribution of income. 
Next, in order to provide an estimate of the magnitude of such effect we refine our 
specification  from  Equation  1  in  two  respects.  First,  we  add  a  dummy  variable  that 
distinguishes observations before and after 1995, to account for observed world trends in LUIS SAN VICENTE PORTES  134
within country inequality;
4  and second, we include a slope dummy for remittances in 
low income countries. We include the low income country interaction dummy variable 
to determine whether relative to other countries, remittances have particularly stronger 
or weaker effects in low income countries. We also include an intercept dummy variable 
for low income countries. 
Under the new specification we pool the data and estimate the parameters by OLS. 
The pooled data provides a cross-section of observations on decile income, remittances 
and the other control variables. In Table 1 we report the coefficient estimates, with (log) 













sec  inflation  openness  (after) 1994 
dummy  
1
st Decile  0.036**  0.397***  1.121***  0.831***  -0.142***  0.079  -0.230*** 
  (0.017)  (0.037)  (0.092)  (0.180)  (0.036)  (0.093)  (0.065) 
2
nd Decile  0.015*  0.266***  1.198***  0.550***  -0.176***  0.060  -0.185*** 
  (0.009)  (0.023)  (0.054)  (0.112)  (0.023)  (0.057)  (0.035) 
3
rd Decile  0.009  0.206***  1.185***  0.399***  -0.176***  0.031  -0.146*** 
  (0.007)  (0.016)  (0.038)  (0.083)  (0.023)  (0.045)  (0.026) 
4
th Decile  0.007  0.158***  1.167***  0.300***  -0.160***  0.017  -0.112*** 
  (0.006)  (0.010)  (0.028)  (0.065)  (0.021)  (0.037)  (0.021) 
5
th Decile  0.005  0.113***  1.151***  0.217***  -0.146***  0.012  -0.095*** 
  (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.021)  (0.051)  (0.022)  (0.029)  (0.017) 
Notes: This table reports the estimated coefficients and robust standard errors (in parenthesis) of Equation 1, 
for the dependent  variable reported in the first column. ***, **, * represents 1%, 5%, 10% significance. 
Observations: 277. The estimates for the intercept and low income country dummy variable are omitted. The 
goodness of fit for these regressions is increasing in income and ranges from 0.81 to 0.98. Given that the 
distribution of income is skewed to the right in most countries, and that mean income is part of the set of 
regressors, the higher the decile the better the fit. 
 
 
Based on our cross-country sample, we find that remittances have a positive and 
significant effect on the income of the first and second income deciles. This effect is 
stronger for the first decile and declines across the bottom half of the distribution of 
income. 
Furthermore,  the  impact  of  remittances  in  low  income  countries  is  an  order  of 
 
4 Firebaugh (2003, p. 164) documents a significant increase in global (within-country) income inequality 
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magnitude larger than that of the average effect on the whole sample. Table 1 suggests 
that  this  effect  is  statistically  significant  in  the  bottom  half  of  the  distribution. 
Quantitatively, our results imply that a 1 percent increase in remittances to a low income 
country would raise income of the first decile by approximately 0.4 percent. This effect 
decreases  as  one  moves  up  in  the  distribution.  This  elasticity  is  approximately  0.11 
percent for the fifth decile. 
 
 









sec  inflation  openness  (after) 1994 
dummy  
6
th Decile  0.003  0.075***  1.139***  0.127***  -0.109***  0.012  -0.077*** 
  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.016)  (0.040)  (0.012)  (0.023)  (0.013) 
7
th Decile  0.002  0.039***  1.118***  0.045  -0.088***  0.012  -0.055*** 
  (0.004)  (0.008)  (0.012)  (0.029)  (0.009)  (0.019)  (0.010) 
8
th Decile  0.000  0.007  1.069***  -0.020  -0.057***  0.000  -0.030*** 
  (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.023)  (0.006)  (0.013)  (0.008) 
9
th Decile  -0.001  -0.019***  1.007***  -0.119***  -0.004  -0.011  0.012 
  (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.022)  (0.005)  (0.014)  (0.008) 
10
th Decile  -0.002  -0.095***  0.801***  -0.293***  0.124***  -0.031  0.132*** 
  (0.007)  (0.013)  (0.025)  (0.061)  (0.014)  (0.036)  (0.020) 
Notes: This table reports the estimated coefficients and robust standard errors (in parenthesis) of Equation 1, 
for the dependent  variable reported in the first column. ***, **, * represents 1%, 5%, 10% significance. 
Observations: 277. The estimates for the intercept and low income country dummy variable are omitted. The 
goodness of fit for these regressions ranges from 0.94 to 0.99 and is decreasing in income. 
 
 
In Table 2 we present the coefficient estimates for top 50 percent of the population. 
Consistent with the trend from Table 1, the effect of remittances in low income countries 
remains positive and significant in the sixth and seventh deciles. However, for the eighth 
decile this effect becomes insignificant and negative and significant in the ninth and 
tenth deciles. 
The negative effect of remittances at the top of the distribution could be associated to 
lower growth due to the outflow of high-skilled workers. For instance, the World Bank 
(2006) cites among other negative effects of high-skilled migration on origin countries, 
the difference in private and social returns when educated workers interact with other 
skilled workers, thus hampering growth and the income of non-migrant skilled workers. 
In terms of the other regressors we find a positive effect of secondary education in 
the  bottom  60  percent  of  the  population.
5  In  parallel  to  other  studies,  we  find  that 
 
5 The non-significant estimates on the 7th and 8th deciles, along with the negative estimate for the top 10 
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inflation is a form of a regressive tax as it has a larger negative effect among the poor. In 
regard to the effect of trade openness on income, we find no significant effect (neither 
positive nor negative) in decile income. We interpret this finding as further evidence on 
the  contested  effects  of  globalization  on  income  and  inequality.
6  Finally,  we  find  a 
monotone decrease in income in the first eight deciles, no effect on the ninth decile, and 
an increase in income of the top ten percent of the distribution since 1995. This trend is 
consistent with Firebaugh (2003), who documents an increase in inequality around the 
world. All else equal, lower income shares at the bottom of the distribution and a larger 
share at the top imply larger inequality. 
An important empirical question is whether for low income countries the difference 
in  the  estimated  effect  of  remittances  across  deciles  reported  in  Tables  1  and  2,  is 
statistically significant. For this purpose, we estimate the set of regressions captured in 
Equation 1 as seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). The SUR estimates allow us to 
perform joint hypothesis tests across equations by exploiting any correlation among the 




Table 3.    SUR Estimation Cross-Equation Test 
(Hypothesis:  1 b (LIC),  1 b = dk (LIC), dl) 
Decile  value p -  
k  l   
1  2  0.122 
2  3  0.013 
3  4  0.001 
4  5  0.000 
5  6  0.001 
6  7  0.001 
7  8  0.004 
8  9  0.058 
9  10  0.043 
Notes: This table reports the cross-equation hypothesis test that the effect of remittances on decile income is 
equal  in  subsequent  deciles,  based  on  the  SUR  estimates  of  Equation  1.  The  last  column  presents  the 





percent of the population, suggest that other proxies for human capital linked to higher education may have 
better explanatory power for household income at the top of the distribution. 
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Table 3 reports the likelihood that the effect of remittances on decile income is equal 
in subsequent deciles for low income countries. Although the difference of the effect 
between the  first and second  deciles is statistically indistinguishable at a 10  percent 
significance  level,  these  tests  confirm  that  the  effect  is  positive,  decile  specific  and 
decreasing in income  for at least 70 percent of the population (see  Tables 1 and 2). 
Furthermore, the negative effect of remittances at the top 20 percent of the distribution is 
increasing in income. 
A  possible  concern  about  the  OLS  estimates  reported  above  is  whether  they  are 
biased  due  to  measurement  error,  some  sort  of  unobserved  country-specific 
characteristics  correlated  with  say,  income  per  capita;  or  reverse  causality  between 
inequality and per capita income. 
The  econometric  model specified in Equation 1, suggests that taking  the  path  of 
aggregate income as given, remittances increase the income of the poor and decreases 
inequality. However, there is no theoretical connection from decile income to aggregate 
growth. From an empirical standpoint the literature has yet to reach a consensus on the 
relationship between inequality and growth.
7 
Since our econometric specification is silent about the effect of inequality on mean 
income, we test for endogeneity through a series of Hausman tests that validate the use 
OLS as our preferred estimator. This is because OLS estimates are more efficient than 
those  from  Instrumental  Variables  when  the  explanatory  variables  are  exogenous. 
Following Dollar and Kraay (2002), we instrument real GDP per capita with the growth 
rate of real GDP per capita over the  preceding five years. Then, we run a series  of 
heteroskedasticity-robust  Hausman  tests  on  Equation  1  with  decile  income  as  the 





5.    CONCLUSION 
 
This paper quantifies the impact  of remittances along the  distribution  of income. 
Based  on a  panel  of  countries  we  find that the  effect  of remittances is  positive and 
monotone  decreasing  for  the  bottom  70  percent  of  the  population  in  low  income 
countries. In contrast, we find that at the top of the distribution, larger remittances are 
 
7 Barro (2000) and Forbes (2000) discuss the channels through which inequality affects growth. While 
Barro’s findings suggest that inequality slows growth, Forbes’ suggest the contrary. 
8 In addition to income group dummies that attempt to control for unobserved country characteristics, we 
computed the fixed effects estimates of the coefficients of Equation 1 to eliminate time-invariant country 
specific characteristics. However, because there are few observations, and little time variation in remittances 
by country, large standard errors render the coefficient estimates on remittances statistically indistinguishable 
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associated with lower decile income for the top 20 percent of the population. 
Quantitatively, for a representative country the effect of remittances on the bottom 
10 percent of the population is marginal, as a 1 percent increase in remittances would 
raise the first decile income by 0.04 percent. However, the same percentage increase in 
remittances to a low income country would be associated with a 0.4 percent increase on 
the first decile mean income. 
From a policy perspective, our findings imply that, all else equal, remittances not 
only reduce poverty, but also reduce inequality since the income at the bottom of the 
distribution  increases,  while  the  income  at  the  top  declines;  particularly  so  in  low 
income countries. 
In terms of welfare, future research ought to explore whether remittances also reduce 
consumption inequality, and furthermore how effective are they to smooth consumption 







The list of countries below comprise the sample used for the estimates reported in 
Tables 1 and 2. 
Country List 
Country  Observations  Years 
Argentina  10  1980, 1986, 1992-1996, 1998-2000 
Australia  4  1981, 1985, 1986, 1989 
Austria  9  1983, 1987, 1994-2000 
Belgium  5  1985, 1988, 1992, 1995, 1996 
Bangladesh  4  1981, 1983, 1986, 1988, 1996 
Bolivia  4  1993, 1996, 1999, 2000 
Brazil  16  1979, 1981, 1983-1993, 1995, 1996, 1999 
Chile  4  1987, 1989, 1990, 2000 
China  2  1995, 1998 
Colombia  6  1992, 1995, 1996, 1998-2000 
Costa Rica  1  1981 
Denmark  4  1992, 1997-1999 
Ecuador  5  1994, 1995, 1998-2000 
Finland  18  1976, 1977, 1981, 1985, 1987-2000 
France  12  1975, 1979, 1981, 1984, 1989, 1994-2000 
Great Britain  14  1987-2000 
Greece  6  1995-2000 
Guatemala  2  1998, 2000 
India  1  1975 REMITTANCES, POVERTY AND INEQUALITY  139
Indonesia  4  1984, 1990, 1993, 1996 
Ireland  4  1994-1997 
Israel  4  1979, 1986, 1992, 1997 
Italy  20  1970, 1975-1982, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995-2000 
Latvia  2  1996, 1998 
Madagascar  1  1993 
Mexico  7  1984, 1989, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 
Malaysia  6  1979, 1984, 1987, 1989, 1992, 1995 
Netherlands  12  1977, 1983, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1994-2000 
Norway  10  1982, 1984-1992, 1994-2000 
Panama  1  1979 
Peru  2  1994, 1998 
Philippines  4  1988, 1991, 1994, 2000 
Portugal  8  1980, 1990, 1995-2000 
Paraguay  2  1995, 1999 
Slovenia  3  1998-2000 
South Korea  10  1976, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1993, 1995-1997 
Spain  8  1980, 1990, 1995-2000 
Sri Lanka  4  1979, 1982, 1991, 1996 
Sweden  9  1979, 1981, 1987, 1991, 1992, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2000 
Switzerland  1  1992 
Thailand  8  1975, 1981, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996 
Trinidad and Tobago  1  1992 
Uganda  1  2000 
United States  5  1986, 1991, 1994, 1997, 2000 
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